

ADAPTIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION AND MIGRATION

The Case of Cash Transfers in Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Malawi

FINAL REPORT



Priya Deshingkar, Rachel Godfrey Wood and Christophe Béné

This report has been produced by the Research Programme Consortium for the UK Department for International Development (DFID) Adaptation Knowledge and Tools programme and published through Evidence on Demand.

The Adaptation Knowledge and Tools programme is a DFID-funded programme intended to maximise the effectiveness of UK and international investment in climate change adaptation and resilience. The knowledge and tools generated through this programme are expected to promote greater understanding of what constitutes best practice in adaptation, as well as better international cohesion and coordination around adaptation. Through these entry points the programme expects to increase the quality of international and UK adaptation programming and reduce its risk.

The views expressed in the report are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily represent DFID's own views or policies, or those of Evidence on Demand.

DFID welcome comments and suggestions, and any feedback on these documents should be sent to the ICF Secretariat (ICFSecretariat@DFID.gov.uk).

Acknowledgements

This research would not have been possible without the hard work and commitment of the field research team – Adamnesh Atnafu, Jali Bekele, Janet Nasoi, Irene Maeri, Esther Dungamaro, Christine Graham, Brian Chadza and Charles Kasambara. John Oucho and Linda Oucho trained the research teams and provided invaluable support to them in the field. The authors are grateful to Mark Davies, Stephen Devereux and Richard Black for providing extensive comments on previous drafts of this report. We would also like to thank UKaid-DFID for supporting this research and the DFID country offices for assisting the research team in identifying the study sites.

Table of Contents

Key Findings	5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	7
Background and Analytical Framework	8
The Context	14
Ethiopia	15
Tanzania	17
Kenya	18
Malawi	19
Methods	20
RESULTS	22
Allocation and Impacts of Cash Benefits	22
Migration Dynamics	22
Young Migrants	27
Migration – Adaptive Or Not?	30
Staying Put – Maladaptation or Adaptation?	33
Conclusions: Social Protection Needed For Migrants	37
Next Steps	38
References	39
Appendix 1	43

Key Findings

- This report presents the results of a short qualitative study aimed at gaining a deeper understanding of the links between cash transfers and migration, and the implications for long-term adaptation in the context of rapid climate change.
- Twenty in-depth interviews, a series of focus groups and key informant interviews were conducted in each of the four countries, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Malawi, targeting beneficiary and non-beneficiary households of four different cash transfer programmes.
- All four cash transfer programmes had different objectives, types of beneficiaries and eligibility criteria, making direct comparisons difficult. None of these programmes precluded the possibility of migration.
- The research provides important insights into the migration decision-making process at the household level and the possible role of cash transfers in that process. Overall, the interviews suggest that cash transfers have rarely been used directly to fund migration either because the amount of the cash benefit was too small to finance migration as in the case of Kenya, because older beneficiaries wanted to stay back and diversify locally as in Ethiopia or because young people migrated without the knowledge and permission of their guardians who tended to be the cash beneficiaries as seen in Ethiopia and Tanzania. Cash transfers may have indirectly facilitated migration for higher education or remunerative jobs by enabling the completion of primary education in Malawi.
- As expected, in all four countries young people were more likely to want to migrate compared to older people. For older boys and young men the reasons were usually a search for remunerative employment or higher education; for girls and young women the reasons were more complex and included marriage as well as escaping neglect and/or abuse.
- In Malawi results suggest that cash transfers have led to a shift in the type of migration, for adolescent girls and boys, from forced migration for marriage and labour to migration for higher education.
- In Ethiopia and Malawi more cases of using cash transfers to stay back were encountered especially among older people. Although farmers recognized that environmental conditions were worsening, they had strong social, cultural or emotional reasons for wanting to stay including an attachment to their villages and having to look after relatives.
- While it is likely that people who choose to stay will be vulnerable to worsening conditions over time (Foresight 2011:118), these risks were mitigated to some extent by a diversification of income sources which were partially enabled by the cash transfer and associated access to credit programmes. In that respect cash beneficiaries who did not

migrate were better off than non-beneficiaries as the latter were trapped in a deteriorating situation without the means to diversify.

- The report is also in agreement with the Foresight Report in saying that reducing rural-urban migration should not be a policy goal. Instead of attempting to design policies that are aimed at controlling migration, social protection should be provided for rural-urban migrants in order to reduce their vulnerability to a number of risks at destination.
- Possible next steps for upscaling and consolidating the findings of this research are identified including analysis of LSMS and M&E data from cash transfer projects and developing a typology of cash-migration linkages based on programme design, beneficiary profiles and migration patterns.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the results of a short qualitative study aimed at gaining a deeper understanding of the links between cash transfers and migration and the implications for long term adaptation in the context of rapid climate change. Interviews with cash transfer project beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Malawi suggest that overall, cash transfers rarely been used directly to migrate. In the few cases where cash was used for migration, there was no discernible pattern: in both the single case in Ethiopia and single case in Malawi cash benefits were used to enable migration for higher education and in the two cases in Kenya cash benefits were used to enable a young person to migrate in the expectation that he or she would send back remittances.

A likely reason for the lack of connection between cash transfers and migration is that young migrants leave without the knowledge or permission of their guardians (who are the direct recipients of the cash transfers). Young people increasingly migrate to capital cities hoping to find better employment and/or education opportunities. Most of these cities however are themselves vulnerable to adverse impacts of climate change. It is unlikely that any change in the cash programme design will alter this rural to urban migration trend. Instead policy should work to support mobility by reducing its risks and maximizing its benefits.

The research also found some evidence in Ethiopia and Malawi that cash transfers can reduce the need to migrate, in particular amongst relatively older people who do not want to move away from their native villages. Arguably this could have negative impacts in the longer term (mal-adaptation) by trapping people in livelihood strategies that are not sustainable in the context of deteriorating conditions for farming brought about by shifts in climate patterns. This predicament is somewhat tempered however by the fact that some of the cash recipients staying behind have succeeded in diversifying out of agriculture, through e.g. investing in non-farm activities such as petty trade. But as in the case of migration, these tend to be the relatively better endowed, with the aptitude for risk-taking and entrepreneurial skills.

For older people who have chosen to stay back, cash provides only a temporary solution, which will not reduce vulnerability in the longer term especially if cropping/livestock keeping conditions continue to deteriorate. But these disadvantages need to be seen against the position that they are in their life cycle and whether they are able to adapt to worsening circumstances if cash transfers were to be withdrawn or they were resettled.

Finally, this research highlights the urgent need to develop policy responses that address vulnerable rural-urban migrants. Current debates on social protection for migrants mainly address the portability and access to rights for international movements between countries. In contrast debates about internal (domestic) migrants are rare. Urgent action is required to address the social protection needs of internal migrants and move away from policies that attempt to control such migration. In light of this finding, recommendations are made for more research directly linking social protection and internal migration.

Overall, the interviews provide important insights into the migration decision-making process and the role of cash transfers in that process. In that regard, the interviews extends the analysis of the determinants of migration by demonstrating the importance of factors other than economic factors such as aspirations 'for a better life' or escaping neglect and abuse among young migrants.

The findings of this research however need to be interpreted with caution, as they are based on a small number of interviews. In particular they should not be used to guide decisions related to

the design of cash transfer projects in the future. Instead, further analysis needs to be conducted, based on a larger sample across regions, programmes and countries and recommendations made for possible ways forward.

Background and Analytical Framework

The research was undertaken to gain a better understanding of the links between cash transfers and migration and how this is affecting long-term adaptation prospects in the context of rapid climate change. The terms of reference from DFID are appended. Specific aims were to assess how, and under what conditions cash transfers are effective in enabling individuals and households to choose migration as an effective adaptation strategy, and what systems, mechanisms and policies could be put in place to improve this choice, as well as to increase the likelihood of successfully establishing new livelihood strategies on arrival in the new location.

The report synthesises the findings of qualitative research conducted in rural and urban locations in four countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Malawi. Given the time and resources available, in-depth interviews with beneficiaries and control households; key informant interviews and focus group discussions were deemed to be effective for gaining insights into household decision making and cash allocation processes and the role of cultural and historical factors in these processes. Although the initial intention was to try to select households with a long history of migration i.e. with one or more migrating members in the last five years and households with a relatively recent migration history (first migration within the previous year), this effort was abandoned as it became clear that it was difficult to identify ex-ante households that fell into one or the other category. Instead beneficiary households with migrants and non-beneficiary households with migrants were interviewed.

Cash Transfers Programmes

Cash transfers in general are a form of social assistance that provide direct and predictable support at regular intervals to poor individuals or households in order to smooth income and consumption and thus reduce vulnerability. Most programmes take a multidimensional view of poverty and aim to strengthen human capabilities through better nutrition and education but also by improving inclusion and status within community/society. Recent programmes also recognise unequal access to resources within the household as major source of vulnerability and target women instead of the male heads of households.

The choice of cash transfer programmes for the study was based on a review of the literature as well as discussions with DFID and other stakeholders. Efforts were made to choose cash transfer programmes currently in operation and funded by DFID in order to generate findings relevant for future programming. In Ethiopia the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) was the most obvious choice due to its large coverage, longer duration

and the involvement of DFID; in Kenya the Hunger and Safety Net Programme (HSNP) was chosen due to the growing effect of deteriorating climate conditions on population and some anecdotal reports of household migrating using HSNP transfers. In Malawi the Mchinji cash transfer project was the only active cash transfer project but was funded by other donors and in Tanzania the Community based Conditional Cash Transfer component of the Japanese funded TASAF –II (Tanzania Social Action Fund) was chosen because it is the only major cash transfer project operating at present in the country.

The four programmes included in the study were therefore relatively different. Table 1 below provides an overview of these four cash transfer programmes and presents some hypothetical links with migration. The programmes diverge in terms of amounts transferred; criteria for inclusion; and duration of the programme. While the HSNP and Mchinji provide transfers for the household as a unit, PSNP and TASAF-II allocate money by individuals in the household.

Table 1 Comparative outline of the four cash transfers programmes included in the study and their potential links to migration.

Cash Transfer Project	Amount of cash transfer in dollars per month	Beneficiaries	Conditions	Potential migration impacts
PSNP	3.9 US\$ per person for six months/year additional for school going children	Poor HH in food insecure woredas.	5 days work per person, none for labour constrained HHs (comprised of people with disabilities, pregnant women and lactating mothers, very old people).	Although per person benefits are small, families with many school going children could have a substantial transfer that could in theory help migration but also investment in local enterprise if there are savings. Schooling conditions could prevent youth migration.
HSNP	20.7 US\$ per HH	HHs identified as poor under community-based targeting, people over 55 years, HH's with a high dependency ratio	None	HHs with an elderly beneficiary could have youth and adults who are able to migrate;
TASAF-II Community Based Conditional Cash Transfer	5 US\$ per elderly person or per under-18-year old (in Bagamoyo)	Under 18 and over 60-year old in HH's identified as poor by the community leaders	1 health visit a year for over 60's, monthly clinic visits for under 5's, 80% school attendance for 5-18-year olds.	The schooling benefit could prevent youth migration; Although per person benefits are small, families with many school going children could have a substantial transfer that could in theory help migration or investment in local enterprise if there are savings.
Mchinji Social Cash Transfer	4-13 US\$ per HH depending on HH size.	Ultra poor (bottom 10%) and with labour	School attendance	The definition of labour constrained does not preclude the migration of under 18s

Project	Bonuses for primary school and secondary school going children	constraints (headed by someone over 65, under 18, or someone with disability, living with HIV/AIDS, or with over four dependents).		which is widespread in the area. The benefit for secondary school going children could in theory reduce youth migration
---------	----------------------------------------------------------------	------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	--	-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Although the sums per individual are very low, the total amount received by households could be substantial if additional amounts are received for school-going children. In theory benefits aimed at the schooling of children could preclude the migration of 12-18 year olds which is widespread in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, it is also possible that the benefits would improve migration chances by providing better prospects for education (a known migration enabler see for example McKenzie *et al.* 2007). In the case of the Mchinji project which targets labour scarce households (i.e. no able bodied adults or high dependency ratio), under 18s could still migrate.

What is not clear however from this overview is the types of migration that could occur. In this context even the delivery mechanism of the programme could have a bearing. Indeed beneficiaries usually have to remain at home to claim the benefit. In these conditions, in order for migration to occur, the migration of the beneficiary would have to take place through shorter temporary movements, i.e. in between cash allocation times. The more likely possibility is that other members of the household migrate i.e. those who are not the direct beneficiaries of the programme. These questions are probed through the empirical research presented here.

Analytical Framework

While early social protection programmes assumed that the majority of the poor are inactive in the labour market, the new generation of programmes aims to maximise impacts on labour market participation – e.g. education conditionality can reduce child labour, ensure a better transition from school to work and build the skills of the future workforce (Barrientos 2006). But there is no real consensus on how conditional cash transfers impact on migration as it has been argued that conditions that require regular health checks or school attendance are likely to reduce migration in the short term. In fact initial reviews of conditional cash transfers (CCTs) in Latin America indicate that none of the major programmes impact on labour force participation or the hours worked among adults; this led some to conclude that unconditional cash facilitates migration while conditional restrains it (Barrientos 2006).

More recent analyses present a more diverse picture and suggest in particular that over time, migration can occur even from households receiving CCTs. For example the

Opportunidades programme in Mexico appears to have facilitated migration through cumulative effects on human capital through education/better nutrition (Azuara 2009) or by relaxing credit constraints for the household, thus enabling it to migrate because the transfer can be used as collateral for a loan (Angelucci, 2004). This was especially important for the poorest unskilled migrants who faced the greatest obstacles to migration (Angelucci, 2011). Attempting to make sense of the evidence Hagen-Zanker and Himmelstine (2012) identify three possible reasons for positive links between CCTs and migration: 1) the transfer is not large enough to satisfy household needs, thus compelling migration; 2) the transfer facilitates migration by financing migration; and 3) the conditionalities fail to keep all household members at home. The second possibility is akin to the migration “hump” argument in economic theories of migration, wherein the mobility increases with increasing wealth and then levels off before falling as incomes rise further and the need to migrate reduces (Martin and Taylor 1996). In its model on causal pathways by which cash transfers can improve household welfare, the DFID Evidence Paper on Cash Transfers also hypothesises that cash transfers could facilitate migration (DFID 2012:5). In fact one reason for commissioning this research was to investigate further whether this scenario is indeed correct, i.e. that cash transfers can help migration.

The present research aims to probe these connections in greater depth in the particular context of cash transfer projects in East Africa. In order to do so we use a conceptual framework that draws on the Foresight Report on Migration and Global Environmental Change, wherein a number of social and economic drivers of migration were identified (Figure 1).




Figure 1 Conceptual Framework

Source: (Foresight Report on Migration and Global Environmental Change)

The framework views migration as an adaptive response (McLeman and Smit 2006, Tacoli 2009, Foresight 2011) rather than a failure of development, where environmental factors are but one of the factors that influence the drivers of migration.

It is important to note here that migration is itself a broad category including several types of population movement, ranging from short term (seasonal or circular) to longer term or permanent relocation. Migration can involve individuals or entire families, especially in the case of the poor where all family members have to work to earn a living and/or when families are displaced by natural disasters and other shocks. We also recognize that the ability to migrate varies within a community, with better educated individuals and households with labour availability usually being able to pursue migration. Also, migration has costs and it is usually the better off who can migrate. Classical economic theory informs us that the young have a greater propensity to migrate (Sjastaad 1962). There are at least three economic reasons for the young to migrate: they move to take advantage of better opportunities as soon as they become economically independent actors; they have a longer working life ahead of them to compensate for the investment in migration; and they have fewer family ties at origin because many are unmarried (McKenzie 2007:5).

That said, not all households that are able to migrate will migrate, as the decision depends on multiple factors including the history of the household, and the available of alternative adaptation options. This is shown in Figure 2 below. Migration can be either a maladaptive “negative” response, or a “positive” form of adaptation depending on the circumstances in which it occurs. Maladaptive migration is likely to occur when shifts in climatic conditions make traditional livelihoods unsustainable and force people into negative forms of diversification including distress or forced migration and other degrading types of labour. For example, there is some evidence that environmental stresses and shocks have led to exploitive forms of labour in Malawi. Worsening drought in recent years has led to abusive types of ganyu work (casual seasonal labouring) such as women being pressurized into sexual relationships with employers carrying the risk of contracting HIV (Bryceson 2006: 197-199). Other studies have shown that migratory ganyu can lead to diversion of labour away from people’s own farms, potentially undermining people’s efforts to increase their own productivity (Whiteside 2000). In other parts of Africa such as Kenya, droughts are becoming more frequent (Wakesa 2006) and this has led to increased male migration, placing a greater burden on women left behind (Oxfam 2006). More generally, when migrants move into locations such as coastal cities that are vulnerable to adverse climatic impacts, this could jeopardise positive impacts in the longer term (Foresight 2011).

Yet cash transfers can also change the nature of livelihood strategies including migration and others, from maladaptive to more adaptive (Fig 2). In the case of migration this could potentially mean a switch from forced or distress migration to more positive and accumulative types of migration, as the cash provides migrants with greater choice of destinations and work.




Figure 2 Conceptual Framework of Adaptive and Maladaptive responses and the role of Cash Transfers

Devereux *et al.* 2007 for instance document some positive indirect benefit of cash transfers in the case of the Dowa Emergency Cash Transfers (DECT) in that ganyu workers were empowered to demand higher wages and enjoyed higher incomes than they normally earn during the ‘hungry season’. Similarly, evidence from the Meket Livelihoods Development Project suggests a reduction in temporary out-migration of productive family members (Aklu and Kiros 2005, cited in Adams and Kebede 2005, SCUUK 2008). This could mean that the need to engage in degrading forms of migration to earn cash can be reduced when other forms of income became available. The Mchinji project is also said to have reduced the prevalence of low-skilled, vulnerable ganyu work while increasing the ownership of tools and livestock, suggesting a greater focus on household agriculture (Covarrubias and Davis 2012). However the authors observe that this was also associated with a greater role for children in household work and chores (Covarrubias and Davis 2012).

An important context for decisions around livelihoods and migration in sub-Saharan Africa, is that of climate change. Emerging literature suggests that not only many parts of Africa will be affected by climate change, but that poorer households are likely to be particularly vulnerable to its effects, including more frequent and/or more intense droughts and flooding. Introducing climate change into the equation raises two important issues:

- 1) If households decide to pursue migration using cash transfer benefits this will not necessarily lead to a reduction in vulnerability, if migration is towards urban areas that are already over-burdened and vulnerable to adverse impacts from climate change (Foresight Report 2011).

- 2) On the other hand if cash recipients choose to stay this could be “trapping” them in an unsustainable situation as farming conditions deteriorate.

As noted in the terms of reference for this research, the DFID social protection sector strategy paper specifically highlights the risk that adaptation programmes focused only on making agricultural systems more resilient, can trap families into increasingly unsustainable and ever more marginal livelihoods. This concurs with the findings of the Foresight project on Migration and Global Environmental Change where migration is identified as an adaptive strategy to marginal environments and increasingly uncertain livelihoods and where the poorest with lower levels of wealth and social capital may not be able to migrate thus “trapping” them in vulnerable environments and decreasing yields.

The Context

By definition, cash transfer projects are implemented in areas with large numbers of poor people and this often goes hand in hand with adverse environmental and agrarian conditions. Livelihood strategies of the poor living in drought prone areas for example tend to be diversified to cope with seasonal shortfalls in agricultural income. Migration, especially short term seasonal or circular migration, has historically been an important coping strategy for people living in areas that are prone to climatic shocks and stresses in Sub-Saharan Africa.

All four locations are clearly on a common trajectory of a move away from a sole dependence on agriculture towards a more multi-locational and diversified occupational structure arising from growing pressure on land, deteriorating terms of trade in agriculture and youth aspirations for a modern lifestyle (Long 2008; Greiner 2010). This trajectory has acquired momentum for different reasons in different places. While farmers in Ethiopia and Kenya were affected by prolonged droughts in the 1970s and 1980s, rural producers in Tanzania and Malawi were particularly badly hit when fertilizer subsidies were removed under structural adjustment programmes (Bryceson 2002). The consequence is that many rural households are now engaged in a number of non-farm livelihood diversification strategies. This diversification (which includes migration) has also been accompanied by a shift in gender roles within the household. The traditional role of the male head of the household as the sole breadwinner has now been complemented by or even replaced by others in the household including (women, youth and children) engaging in different activities such as different types of migration.

Ethiopia




While drought is the most common source of shock at the household level causing consumption and income shortfalls, the migration context in Ethiopia is altogether different because of the government's policies for limiting migration (Ellis and Woldehanna 2005). For example, north-south migration was interrupted when provinces were reorganised based on ethnicity (Ezra 2001). Large-scale resettlement plans were also implemented after the famines of 1984-85, to move people away from the northern highlands to sparsely populated parts of the country. Several accounts suggest however that the resettlement was not successful and people were forcibly resettled to areas where they were exposed to disease, conflict with local pastoralists and inadequate support to establish themselves (Tareke 2009, Pankhurst 1992, Rahmato 2003).

Instead, the government aims to support smallholder development and discourage commercialization of land for fear that this would lead to the concentration of landholdings and the 'urbanisation of poverty' (presumably through rural-urban migration) (Devereux *et al.* 2005). Such land-based strategies may not make sense in places where rural livelihoods have severely deteriorated due to declining farm sizes, environmental degradation, and natural disasters; consequently there are very few opportunities for income diversification that are available locally as in the case of the Amhara region. It is hardly surprising that migration occurs despite government efforts to control it. Rural-rural migration is more prevalent in the Amhara region but there is a marked tendency among youth to migrate to urban areas (Sharp *et al.* 2003). Overall, the rural Ethiopian highlands have been characterized by chronic poverty, food insecurity, high population pressure on land resources, and exposure to recurrent droughts (World Bank, 2005 cited in Gray and Mueller (2011). Labour migration has long been a coping strategy against drought especially for the poorest (Gray and Mueller 2011). Significant migration from Northeast Ethiopia is traceable to the late 1980s when, after repeated droughts, people's capacity to cope eroded to such an

extent that searching for livelihoods elsewhere was the only option for many (Rahamato 1991). The land redistribution in 1997 that rendered many people landless or near landless also gave rise to a new class of migrants (Asfaw *et al.* 2010). Indeed Addis Ababa's migrant population in the year 2000 (cited in Sharp *et al.* 2003) showed that women migrants (mostly single or divorced) to Addis Ababa outnumber males, and that women migrants are, on average, younger than their male counterparts. More recently migration into smaller towns has also been documented (Baker 2012). The majority of migrants to the small towns studied by Baker appear to have increased their security and wellbeing, and the author advocates a development strategy based on supporting small towns such as these.

The study site of the present research was located in Amhara division which is one of the nine ethnic divisions (kililoch) of Ethiopia, populated mainly by the Amhara people. It borders with Tigray to the north, Sudan to the west, Afar to the east and Oromo to the south. The research was conducted in the woreda of 'Enebse Sar Meder' with a population of 142,129 and an annual rainfall of 900 – 1000 mm. Twenty four of the 33 kebeles in the woreda are classified as chronically food insecure. The capital city of the woreda is Merto Lemariam about 363 km from Addis Ababa and 180 km from Bahir Dar. According to PSNP officials, there are 37,485 beneficiaries with 33,210 beneficiaries on the public works component (15,945 male and 17,265 female) and 4275 on direct support i.e. those who are not required to work because they are incapable of working (Male 1,517 female 2,758). In recent years, payments in the region were shifted entirely to monetary payments, having previously been in food or a combination of food and money. Meanwhile, the focus group discussions in the urban area took place in Addis Ababa.

Tanzania



Although rural-urban migration in Tanzania can be traced back to the colonial period (Mbonile 1993), it gained momentum in the 1990s as rural areas experienced severe economic hardship under structural adjustment programmes (SAP) combined with new trade opportunities opening up with the liberalization of the economy (Mbonile and Simon 1995). The migration of youth especially the so-called “wamachinga” or petty traders has been the most visible manifestation of the new wave of migration. Viewed with disdain by policy makers, migration nevertheless offers a means of securing livelihoods and survival for children and young people orphaned by AIDS when their families and communities are unable or unwilling to support them (Ruth 2005). In Northern Tanzania, the drought of 1997 and the floods of 1998 marked a major turning point in the traditional way of life for the Maasai (Tacoli 2011). Pastoralism was affected by the loss of pastures, livestock diseases and the low price of cattle (Tacoli 2011). Migration has emerged as a diversification strategy and remittances are used to maintain livestock and help households diversify into agriculture. Economic analyses suggest that, over time, migration has brought benefits: Beegle *et al.* (2011) for instance, using a thirteen-year panel survey, found that migration between 1991 and 2004 added 36 percentage points to consumption growth. Their conclusion is that moving out of agriculture especially through migration was beneficial. By contrast qualitative research (Dungamaro 2009) emphasises the more negative aspects of the migration experience such as the increased burdens on families left behind, erratic remittances, and hardships at destination. The growing migration of women and girls, and shifting attitudes towards it have also been documented in Tanzania. Case studies conducted under the DARE research programme noted that worsening rural conditions have forced rural men to accept their wives' and daughters' mobility for earning cash outside the home (Bryceson 1999).

For this present research, intention originally was to conduct interviews in Chamwino district, but following consultations with key informants, the research team decided to select Bagamoyo. This decision was made on the basis that migration from rural parts of the district to Bagamoyo town and Dar es Salam would provide an opportunity to assess the pros and cons of migration into a coastal town that could be vulnerable to future sea level rise.

Bagamoyo lies in the Pwani Region bordered by the Tanga region to the north, Morogoro region to the west, the Indian Ocean to the east and Kibaha district to the south. The district capital is Bagamoyo town which was the capital of German East Africa and an important coastal trading town. According to the 2002 Tanzania National Census, the population of the district was 230,164. Magomeni village is in the outskirts of Bagamoyo district and has a population of 60,000 people. In this village, 600 households are beneficiaries in the TASAF programme. Kerege is a poor and remote village with a population of roughly 2500 and 213 households are enrolled in the TASAF programme.

Kenya



Pastoralists and farmers in Kenya have developed livelihood systems that accommodate periods of resource scarcity due to drought. However intensifying climate change and deepening drought combined with poor institutional support has overwhelmed people's existing adaptive capacity (Schillinga and Remling 2011). Recent droughts have been particularly severe: the drought of 1999/2000 resulted in 4.7 million people facing starvation. There has been a 3 year prolonged drought leading to animal mortalities, and worsening child nutrition (Wakhungu *et al.* 2010). Northern Kenya is also a volatile area with periodic outbreaks of violence. Diversification of income sources and migration have

now become the main adaptive responses among the Masai and others vulnerable to droughts.

Research on migration into Nairobi city based on data collected in 2003 and 2007 indicates that young adults aged 20-24 are generally very mobile and young women are even more mobile than their male counterparts (Beguy *et al.* 2010). The study further found that a quarter of the total slum population and a third of those aged 15-30 were renewed annually suggesting that circular migration is occurring. The causes for circular migration were insecurity of livelihoods, tenure, and poor basic amenities and social services in slum settlements.

The research site for this study was in Marsabit District, a highly drought prone area where mean annual rainfall ranges between 200 and 400mm, and where 92% of the population are deemed to live in absolute poverty. According to the National Population Census report of 2010, the population of Marsabit is 291,155, amongst which 7000 households (equating to 35,000 people) are recipients of the HSNP.

Malawi



Although historically common, international migration from Malawi decreased in the 1960s after independence when President Banda discouraged migration of workers, especially to South Africa. It was around this time that new agricultural policies were introduced to promote commercial farming. A consequence of these policies was that small rural producers in Malawi suffered a drop in real income as national capital was flowing to commercial farms without sufficient support to small holders (Christiansen 1984). This

migration of impoverished rural producers to the sugar and tobacco estates in the central and southern region started gaining momentum again (Christiansen 1984: 128). However by 1977 the pattern had changed: while the Northern region remained a net labour exporter and the Central region remained a net importer, the Southern region became a net exporter of labour. Mchinji (the area included in the present project) remained a labour receiving area because of its tobacco estates and a majority of migrants were males aged between 10 and 29 (Christiansen 1984).

Although migration to South Africa did increase again in the 1990s this was mainly informal (Andersson 2006 cited in Beegle and Poulin 2012). These days the bulk of migratory movements are internal (Englund 2002) and mainly circular in nature (Mtika 2007 cited in Beegle and Poulin 2012). More recent analysis suggests that there is an increasing tendency towards south-north (often rural-rural) migration as population density in the south increases and tobacco plantations in the north attract labour (Potts 2006: 195).

A study by the Southern Africa Migration Project (SAMP 2006) in Mchinji and Kasungu found that in-migration actually exceeded out-migration. Indeed a survey conducted in 2008 (reported in Miller 2011) shows that only 3.5% of the adults in control households and 5.1% in cash receiving households had migrated out of a 659 control and 704 intervention households. This finding, however, could be due to the fact that only permanent migration was considered. Indeed short term migration seems to be more prevalent: the baseline for the Mchinji cash transfer project shows for instance that more than half the households surveyed had engaged in *ganyu* labour (seasonal off-farm work including migration) over the previous year and only those who were ill, old or unable to find such work did not undertake it (Miller *et al.* 2007). *Ganyu* accounted for 35% of household income as compared to 32% from agricultural produce and 7% from remittances. Also, poor people living in areas that are vulnerable to flooding and drought often engage in *ganyu* work which can include migration (Nangoma, 2007, Whiteside 2000).

The research site for this study was Mlonyeni which is very close to the borders with Zambia and Mozambique. Mlonyeni is one of the nine Traditional Authorities (TA) within Mchinji with a population of roughly 37000 situated 30km from the district headquarters and 120km from Lilongwe. The majority of Mlonyeni are Ngonis most of whom are subsistence farmers growing maize, groundnuts, beans, soyabean and potatoes.

Methods

In all four countries, data was generated through a series of 20 in-depth, household interviews in the cash transfers project catchment areas complemented by at least four interviews of key informants drawn from NGOs, government, project administration and other stakeholder groups, and four focus group discussions conducted in both rural (origin) and urban (destination) areas. Interviews were conducted with households with

beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the cash transfers programmes, both with a history of migration. They were identified using a snowballing method wherein they were purposefully selected to allow the investigation of the issues in the research plan. Efforts were also made to ensure an equal number of control households to compare the “with” and “without” situation with respect to cash benefits.

The objectives, design and eligibility criteria in all four programmes included in this study were very different, making direct comparisons of the programmes difficult. Nonetheless, by adopting a common framework and identical questions in each country, it was possible to highlight differences that are of importance in drawing more general conclusions. The purpose of the work was thus to gain insights into migration-cash transfer linkages by administering the same questions in different contexts with different types of programmes.

RESULTS

Allocation and Impacts of Cash Benefits

End uses for the cash benefit ranged (broadly) from “consumption” to investments with a transformative potential. As intended, the most common use of the money was to buy basic essentials, and in all four countries the programmes seemed to have helped food insecure families tide over the lean season. Although relatively new, the cash transfer component of TASAF had also had (according to key informants and focus group discussions) positive impacts on nutrition and health, but we cannot state this with certainty, as it was not objectively verified. Similarly in Kenya, interviews and discussions suggested that the programme had helped to mitigate the adverse impacts of drought on farming and livestock. Again this information could not be verified rigorously. Other benefits of the programme included mitigating negative impacts of government policies such as the restriction on cutting and selling firewood from forests which has impacted on poor women as in the case of K1¹, a widow living on her own with a daughter in Nairobi as well as the confiscation of livestock for restocking (K4)².

Nearly all the interviews in all four countries suggest that the programmes had significant positive impact on school attendance. In Tanzania beneficiaries reported using the cash in a variety of ways that helped their childrens’ attendance at school such as purchase of uniforms, school exercise books (T4, T10, T11) or paying for security guards to accompany the children to school (TUFFGD10). In the Kenyan and Tanzanian focus group discussions (FGDs) it emerged that the cash was especially useful for the parents of children in secondary school (KFFGD1, KFFGD4). One of the participants said that she had paid off outstanding fees of Ksh 4000 with the cash. TFFGD6 on participant in this FGD cited an occasion where her child had to leave Chalinze boarding school because they didn’t have the money, but then the cash transfer money became available and she was able to send the child back to the boarding school.

Migration Dynamics

As expected migration in both beneficiary and non-beneficiary households emerged as the outcome of a complex interaction of contextual factors such as conflict, climatic triggers and policy changes with household assets (or the lack of assets) and individual attributes such as search for better education and attitudes to risk taking as well as conditionality of the cash transfer.

¹ All the households interviewed as well as the FGDs and key informants were given numbers starting with E for Ethiopia, K for Kenya, T for Tanzania and M for Malawi.

² Restocking is the conventional approach taken to reduce grazing pressure on pastoral systems

In Ethiopia for example, drought and deteriorating conditions in agriculture, land shortages

Box 1 Using the Cash Transfer to Migrate

In Ethiopia the only clear-cut case of the PSNP being used to facilitate migration was in the case of E3, a small-scale land-owner and entrepreneur, whose sister combined both of their PSNP latest payments (140 Birr of the sister's payments, and 280 Birr that E3 had been receiving for herself and one of her two daughters) to finance the cost of migrating to Addis Ababa to look for a job.

Two key issues stand out in this case. Firstly, the household appears to have been upwardly mobile prior to the decision to migrate, partly because E3 inherited land from her father, which she then rented to other farmers. The safety net role of the PSNP has played an important part in E3's mobility, providing her with a source of income when she left her family's care in 2004, and later on when she divorced from her husband in 2006. In addition to this, she also works in the Kebel administration of the PSNP, and has used the safety net payments to establish a small business buying and selling packaged oil with her mother. Meanwhile she has used government loans to purchase five sheep for breeding, and still produces some crops.

The second key factor is that E3's sister's decision to migrate was strongly linked to her having attained a certain degree of education, which was itself partly funded by PSNP payments. Having become educated, the local area could not provide a desirable livelihood for the sister. In the words of E3, 'She left because there is nothing she can do here. She wanted to go where educated people like her were wanted. She said she couldn't get a job here because of her education.' Interestingly, not only has education altered the aspirations of E3's sister, it has also changed local expectations of what she should be doing: 'She left because she didn't want to be criticized for being unemployed after completing her education.' Establishing a profitable business for E3's sister locally was not possible, and although she advised her against leaving, E3 believes that her sister 'had no option'. The desire for an urban livelihood was clearly strong, even overriding the knowledge that E3's brother had already tried and failed to find a job in Addis Ababa. Although E3's sister did not have relatives in Addis Ababa, she had a network based on friends 'in the same situation', and quickly found a job in a 'small enterprise industries bureau'.

At this point in time, this appears to be a successful example showing how sustained access to a safety net can be used to facilitate a livelihood transition. E3 joined and then rejoined the safety net at two crucial junctures in her life (one after leaving the care of her family, and another after divorcing), and used the money to complement the land she inherited from her father to build up a diversified livelihood. Meanwhile, the younger sister has benefited from the PSNP to finance her own education, and ultimately, to pay for the costs of moving to the capital to get a desirable job. However, this case study was exceptional, and E3 emphasises that 'only educated people can find work' in the capital.

and resettlement were mentioned as the main reasons for migration. Rural-rural migration was often to areas where family members had been previously resettled under the Derg regime. There was just one case in the households interviewed where cash benefits seem to have been used to finance migration (box 1). However, in a majority of cases in Ethiopia the link with migration, when it was observed, was the opposite: people had stopped migrating after becoming beneficiaries. We return to this issue in a later section.

In Kenya, there seemed to be a greater variety of push and pull factors that influenced the decision to migrate. Some of the causes that were discussed by the participants included, but are not limited to, conflict related to cattle rustling, the need for better healthcare, for jobs, lack of water, better earnings, land shortages, unemployment for educated people, and changes in government policy. An FGD with pastoralists indicated that the drought had killed livestock which forced these pastoralists to diversify into other occupations such as selling firewood. Government policy banning the cutting and sale of firewood left them later with no option but migration. That said there were only three households with migrants and this may be due to the prohibitive cost of migration (around 3500 KShs or 40 US\$ just for the fare to Nairobi). There were only two cases where the cash transfer had contributed to cover the costs of migration and where the family had saved whatever little they had to fund the travel of one person from the household. The first was K7, an old woman aged 75 years, who had been a beneficiary for a year. The 3500 Kshs needed for the migration of her second son was mobilised from the cash transfer. Her family circumstances had deteriorated suddenly when her older son who was working in the armed forces fell ill. He used to remit between 4000 and 6000 Kshs to his mother and when this stopped, the family decided that the second son should migrate to Nairobi to care for the ailing brother and also to earn some money. They pooled their resources and used some of the cash transfer benefit to enable his migration. The other case was a 78 year old widow who indicated that her daughter had used the cash benefit to migrate to Nairobi to find a job and pay for her children's education. Migration had become the only option for this poor family "Life had become unbearable for us considering my old age, being a widow and living with a daughter who is a single parent to three children. This situation prompted us to discuss and agree on her migration to the big city to look for a job in order to get some money that can facilitate her children's education". She continues "My daughter migrated to Nairobi only after the cash transfer started. We could not even afford her travelling expenses back then. It is that money that facilitated her migration to the city to seek employment that could supplement the little that I was receiving to enable her children to go to school." Her daughter now sends her remittances but she would not disclose the amount. It is also not clear what her work at destination is. In both cases the decision to send a young person away to earn and remit money was a family decision and in that sense the situation in Kenya differed from Tanzania and Ethiopia where young people appeared to migrate without the permission of their guardians.

The situation in Tanzania was different. By all accounts the poorer villages around Bagamoyo are becoming depopulated due to the dearth of options locally and distress sales of land to outsiders. Although the interviews suggest that migration to Dar es Salaam is frequent, there was no clear evidence that the cash benefits were being used to finance migration most probably because the schooling conditionality prevented migration of youth from beneficiary households. While the transport costs from Bagamoyo to Dar Es Salaam are negligible as the two towns are only 65 km away, the total investment required in migration is much higher as it also includes the costs of accommodation, food and the

search for work. For those who do not have relatives at destination, an investment of up to 100,000 Tshs (\$62) was required and interviews suggested that those who planned to migrate usually saved up money through casual labouring. Additionally, there appeared to be widespread migration of adolescent girls and boys (more on this later) but the interviews did not show a connection between their migration and the cash transfers.

In Malawi as well, migration from Mchinji to a variety of locations within and outside the country was widespread including to the town of Blantyre (also known as Mandala, - the second largest city of the country and a centre of finance and commerce) and across the border to Zambia. Three main forms of migration were identified through the interviews and FGDs: girls migrating to join husbands in Zambia and Mozambique³; girls and boys being helped by relatives to move to the city for higher education; and the migration of labourers through recruitment agents coming in from Zambian tobacco farms. In these cases as well, only one interviewee mentioned that cash had been directly used for migration to enable her daughter to go to Ludzi Girls Secondary School in Mchinji. In a number of beneficiary households, adolescent girls and boys had migrated to Blantyre or Mchinji to pursue higher studies and work. Although in most cases the cost of the travel was paid for by the relatives that hosted them it appeared that the cash transfer had enabled them to complete their primary education and although cash benefits would also have been paid for secondary education, many chose to go to another location for that purpose. In non-beneficiary households it was seen that forced migration was more common such as the migration of girls for marriage, pressurised by their parents who lacked the means to support them. Thus the cash benefit appears to have had a positive effect on changing the pattern of migration.

Thus, there were a few examples of cash directly assisting migration, either because young people migrated without the consent of their guardians (Ethiopia and Tanzania), or because migration was too expensive (Kenya) or because older beneficiaries chose to stay back rather than migrating (Ethiopia and Malawi). Cash benefits did indirectly enable migration for higher education in Malawi by allowing children to complete primary education but the cash was not used to fund migration.

Table 2 Summary of Cash Benefits, Costs of Migration, Eligibility Criteria and Migration Outcomes

³ Despite probing, the parents of these girls were not able to say much about their daughters' situation after they left with men from Zambia and Mozambique. It is not clear whether they did indeed go to get married or whether this was a system of recruiting them for work. Further research would be required to better understand this aspect of migration but it was clear that it occurred only in the poorest families and cash beneficiaries did not have to send their daughters away in this manner.

Country and Study Location	Cash Benefit Amount	Cost of Migration	Eligibility	Migration Outcome
Amhara Ethiopia	3.9-19.5 depending on HH six	380 Birr or just over 20 US\$ for the fare alone	Although per person benefits are small, families with many school going children could have a substantial transfer that could in theory help migration but also investment in local enterprise if there are savings. Schooling conditions could prevent youth migration.	Older cash beneficiaries stay; young people migrate from beneficiary and non-beneficiary HHs alike but without the help of cash benefit because they migrate without the knowledge/approval of their guardians. Only one case of young educated girl migrating with the help of cash to find a job in the city
Marsabit, Kenya	20.7 US\$	3500 KShs or just over 40 US\$ for the fare	HHs with an elderly beneficiary could have youth and adults who are able to migrate;	Older beneficiaries prefer to stay back. Two cases of young people in beneficiary HHs using the benefit to migrate to supplement HH income. Migration clearly a HH strategy in this case rather than individual decision
Bagamoyo, Tanzania	5-20US\$	Fare negligible; total cost around 60US\$	The schooling benefit could prevent youth migration; Although per person benefits are small, families with many school going children could have a substantial transfer that could in theory help migration or investment in local enterprise if there are savings.	Young people migrate but without the help of cash transfers because they migrate without the approval/knowledge of their guardians. Although the fare is cheap, living expenses can be high if not living with relatives and they save through casual work in the village before migrating.
Mchinji, Malawi	4-20 US\$	Fare negligible to border area by minibus; around 20 US\$ to Blantyre	The definition of labour constrained does not preclude the migration of under 18s which is widespread in the area. The benefit for secondary school going children could in theory reduce youth migration	Migration of young people for higher education from beneficiary HH although direct use of benefits to fund travel and subsistence not reported. More negative forms of migration among non-beneficiary HH

Young Migrants

In most of the households interviewed, the current cohort of migrants appeared to be very young, usually those who had finished primary school. In Ethiopia and Tanzania it appeared that they left without discussion with, or consent from, the head of the household. “Sometimes they just surprise you, they get up in the morning and say ‘I am going somewhere, I am tired with the life here’ boom they leave.’ (TFFGD6).

It is clear from the interviews that there are strong and conflicting views on migration between those who stay back and those who migrate, with parents and guardians tending to view migration as a risky (and sometimes shameful) activity that would not bring the family any benefits. As one participant in the rural FGD in Tanzania commented (TFFGD4) – “...these children of ours you cannot tell them to do everything, some are hooked on drugs and want to wear revealing clothing in the city”. The young on the other hand, see migration as an opportunity for a better life. The case study of E11, a non-beneficiary with several migrants in the household illustrates these different aspirations (box 2).

Box 1 Conflicting Aspirations of The Old And Young

E11 is a bureaucrat in the governing party, and is comfortable enough not to need the safety net, although his daughter is enrolled in the scheme. E11 has a positive view of the PSNP, and believes that the one of its most significant benefits is that it reduces the dependency of the poor on the rich (‘no one depends on others’), even suggesting that beneficiaries have now reached his levels of living standards.

E11 has one daughter who migrated to Merto Lemariam (with E11’s consent) when she married a teacher. Two of E11’s sister’s children, both of them PSNP recipients, have recently migrated without telling him of their motives. The girl migrated to Bale after divorcing her husband, and is now in agricultural works. The motives for this are not entirely clear, but E11 does not think that she was forced to migrate due to poverty: ‘the girl had a good job here but she deceived us and left.’ Meanwhile, the boy left after failing to maintain a job with a Chinese company, migrating to Nazareth (Adama), and the family have been able to send him money for support. At the same time, there appears to be a disconnect between E11 and his nephew and niece, as he responds to the interviewer’s questions about their motives by saying ‘They tell me they left to make money and that they will be back. But they only tell me this because they think I am upset with them.’ It is clear that he does not want his other children to migrate and prefers to marry his daughters off, pulling one out of school so that she could get married. When this marriage did not work out, E11 used indemnities from a Chinese company to extend his own house so that she could move in.

This case study illustrates the very different livelihood aspirations that are present within households, even ones which, like E11’s, are not among the poorest group. Although E11 strives hard to keep his and his sister’s children in the Kebele, it is clear that he is swimming against a strong current of changing aspirations among young people. His exasperation with these generational differences is summed up with the quote: ‘Our children leave no matter how much they have in their pockets and the money we send is to help to some level but the cost of living will be high there. They rely on relatives there but I think it is better to struggle here than leave.’

There was significant migration of adolescent boys and girls even from beneficiary households. Although TASAF provides cash incentives for schooling of children up to the age of 18, several beneficiaries mentioned that often boys and girls decide to migrate after

completing Class 7 (which is roughly 12 years of age). Although transport costs to Dar Es Salam from Bagamoyo are insignificant, the total cost of migration is much higher in particular because it involves accommodation and food. Unless the migrant is hosted by a relative, these costs have to be borne and can be out of the reach of the poorest. According to the parents of migrant children, they save money through casual labouring to fund migration. Many perceived migration to offer more advantages than staying in school as the example of T10's children shows (Box 3).

Box 2 Children migrating from beneficiary household

T10 has been a beneficiary since the start of the TASAF programme. She has five children, three girls and two boys, and all of them are in Dar es Salam. She said that all of them decided to migrate to Dar Es Salam after finishing primary school. Although she said that she and husband would not encourage young children to go and live in a big city with no one to protect them, there seemed to be an acceptance of the situation. Her eldest son was the first to migrate and he did not know anyone in the city. She said he worked as a farm labourer to fund his trip to the city. The second boy left with the brother when the latter visited his parents for the first time a few months after migrating. T10 says that the siblings were impressed by their brother and how much he had changed since going to Dar Es Salam. He was well dressed and had a mobile phone. They all wanted to be like him and wanted to leave immediately but he said he could afford to take only one of them at a time. Over the next two years they all migrated one after the other. T10 does not know exactly what her children are doing in the city but she knows that they have a rented accommodation and are happy there. She hopes that their children will have a brighter future in the city.

Many interviews mention that relatives play an important role in the migration of young people – encouraging them, paying for the journey and supporting them at destination. However this is not always the case as the discussion with T7 a non-beneficiary, indicates. She has six children who have migrated. While T7 and her husband did not support the first four who migrated 'blindly' to Dar es Salaam, ('to a new places with no relatives'), they did contribute the travel costs of the last two migrated to Moshi. On reflection, though, T7 acknowledges the motives of her children for migrating, noting that 'There are no prospects in this village. We do not even have enough rain. We grow crops they wilt and die.' The older ones have returned to visit, though, and have brought some money.

Key informant interviews and focus group discussions indicate that a key reason for young men migrating is landlessness, which appears to have worsened after the land redistributions of the late 1990s. Other reasons include a desire to find well-paid work and higher education as in the case of T13, a beneficiary in Tanzania (Box 4).

Box 3 Migration After Finishing School

T13 is a female recipient of the TASAF conditional cash transfer, looking after the partially blind son of her late sister. Her other five children have migrated: a daughter, like many of the females in the Tanzanian case study,

migrated as a result of marriage to Chalinze, while the others went to work in construction to Dar es Salaam Chalinze, and Bagamoyo town. As in the case of many others, several of T13's children migrated after completing school to look for better opportunities, and although they come back to visit, she is confident that they will not return permanently to the village. The costs of migrating to Dar es Salaam were not particularly large, and T13's children were able to finance it from doing casual work. She says the benefits from the cash transfer were useful 'in solving everyday issues', like buying food and medical treatment, but not enough for transformation: 'you cannot say it is adequate to buy a piece of land in farming'. She also mentions the significant mistrust that has grown against the programme because of the graduation criteria, leading people often spending just small amounts of time on the programme, and being de-registered without understanding why. She does however receive some money from remittances from her children, who help out: 'They keep quiet for a while then they remember that I am there and they send me money.'

The reasons for the migration of girls and young women were more diverse and include in addition to finding work, neglect or abuse in the family. For example E17's daughter migrated to gold mines in Dembi Dolo recently. According to E17, this was a family decision, and a family relative helped to arrange it. Later in the interview he mentioned however that one reason for sending the daughter away was to placate his wife, who is not the mother of the daughter. Similarly a participant in one of the urban FGDs in Kenya said she decided to migrate because she was being abused by her husband who had taken another wife after he became a beneficiary. She went to live with her sister in Nairobi (KUFGD2).

Previous research in Ethiopia by Erulkar *et al.* (2007) based on a survey of 1000 adolescents aged 10-19 in slum areas of Addis Ababa found that for girls, migration can be a way to escape early marriage. However this was not mentioned during any of the present interviews. What did emerge clearly is that migration is often associated with marriage. This appeared to be especially common in Mchinji (Malawi) where girls from very poor families were marrying men settled in Zambia and Mozambique. This was a dominant pattern among non-beneficiaries. All the costs of marriage were met by the grooms. It appears from the FGDs that these girls are "pressured" into such marriages. The justification given by the parents can be somewhat different (Box 5). There is not enough detail about this kind of migration in terms of the age of the girls, whether or not they were able to exercise any agency at all and how they fared in such liaisons.

Box 4 Marriage Migration Of Girls In Malawi

M18 is a father of three children who have migrated. He farms livestock, maize, and green vegetables, and receives some assistance from his migrated children, who live in Mchinji town and Lilongwe. He ascribes a number of motives to his daughters' migrations, both of which were linked to their marriages. These include poverty, 'laziness' at school, and the peer pressure to get married young. He, himself, part-financed the journey of his son to Lilongwe, where the latter got a job via agents and was probably assisted on arrival by some friends. It is not clear what work he is doing in Lilongwe.

M16 is a 58 year old non-beneficiary woman. She and her husband work as casual labourers in the village and Mchinji town. Her daughter migrated after primary school to get married. According to M16, she married of her own choice, because "She was matured. We could not afford school fees for her to enrol for secondary school. Hence she decided to get married to get support from her husband."

Beegle and Poulin (2012), drawing on their work on the ‘Marriage Transitions in Malawi’ project, highlight the increase in marriage migration in the country. The authors note that this appears to be a departure from the traditional pattern of matrilocal residence after marriage among the Chewa and Yao ethnic groups. There is now a pattern of greater mobility among young women compared to young men.

A number of interviewees also mentioned the existence of a system of labour recruitment agents coming in from Zambia and offering to pay the costs of migration for young men. Very little information could be gleaned in such a short time about this system. The experience in other countries has shown that agents do facilitate access to labour markets and make it possible for the poor to migrate without having to spend upfront (they have to repay through work) but at the same time the terms and conditions of work under agents tend to be exploitative. Further probing of this issue would be necessary to better understand migration dynamics.

Migration – Adaptive Or Not?

Cities face particular challenges in adapting to climate change: two-thirds of all cities with populations of over five million are at least partially located in low-elevation coastal zones which may be vulnerable to sea-level rise, increased storm intensity and flooding. At the same time water stress is projected in many urban areas, and may be particularly acute in high elevation cities which are dependent on glacial melt and precipitation. A key conclusion of the UK Government’s Foresight Report, Migration and Global Environmental Change (2011: 19), is that migrants to cities in low-income or middle-income countries are especially vulnerable to climate change as they tend to live in high-density settlements in areas prone to environmental risks, and may not have the human, social or financial capital to protect themselves from these risks.

For migrants, the first point of arrival in a city is often an informal settlement or slum such as Kibera in Nairobi (population of 1.7 million) and their first jobs are often in the informal sector. In general migrants arrive to a hostile policy context. Research by the UNDP has shown that policy positions on rural-urban migration are predominantly negative, as 67 per cent of all governments had policies to halt or limit rural-urban migration even as late as 2009 (United Nations, 2010) and this perspective runs across many parts of Africa (Adebusoye 2006) with very little hard evidence to substantiate the negative claims made. Many countries have attempted to, but failed, to reduce rural-urban migration through job creation in rural areas.

Some insights on the types of vulnerability faced by migrants were provided by the urban focus group discussions, and broad areas of vulnerability were identified:

- 1) Younger children migrating to urban areas without the support of relatives are possibly amongst the most vulnerable as they lack parental support and access to social networks that older migrants may have;
- 2) Hardships related to poor access to urban services, and poor living and working conditions as evidenced by the topic of the risk of STDs and malaria which was discussed by several participants;
- 3) Non-payment or cheating by employers – Focus group discussion in Mchinji where participants discussed the risk of not being paid, getting arrested by police and/or being framed and being made to work as slaves;
- 4) Lack of accommodation and being regarded as criminals (Box 7).

Box 5 Difficulties At Destination

During a focus group discussion migrants in Addis Ababa mentioned having to sleep on the streets as a major problem. They felt that not having an identity card pushed them into this situation. They also felt that they were discriminated against and were regarded as thieves. Being easily identified by their clothing and language also prevented easy integration. One of them expressed the desire to return to his village because of these problems but others were ambivalent because the situation back at home was also difficult. None of them are making enough money to send back to their villages, and because their work is irregular they can only make vague estimates of how much they might earn (e.g. 600 birr per month if they're lucky). Sometimes they are not paid.

Conditions at destination

Given that most of the interviews were at source and so much migration occurred without the knowledge of the interviewee, it was difficult to judge whether or not it had led to positive or negative outcomes and what future prospects were. The table below provides an overview of the types of migration that were encountered in the sample together with key words that indicate aspects of the migration experience. The table shows that not all migration was to urban areas. There were several cases where migration had been to another rural area. There seemed to be more females in rural-rural migration streams. While migration to the capital city was clearly the most important in terms of the cases that mentioned it, migration to small towns was also seen in a number of cases. The differences in the causes for migration among males and females are also visible; males migrated for employment/business, land problems and failure in farming whereas females migrated for education or marriage or after the death of a family member. Being influenced by others and being helped by relatives was common to both females and males. There were very few cases of international migration and those were mainly male. One thing that is typical of migrants moving into low-level, low barrier jobs is that they move rapidly from one job to another and also change their living quarters so this must be factored in any discussion on

the vulnerability of migrants at destination. Also, many stay with relatives who could already be well established and may not be in the worst locations in the city.

Table 3 Migration Typology in the sample

	Male	Female	Unknown
Destination Rural	M17 T2 E1 18b	M5, M6, M10, M12, T1a, T1b, T5 T6c T19c E2 E6 E18 TUMFGD6c TFFGD2 TFFGD1b TUFFGD2c TMFGD7	T14 T15 T15b T15c T16 T17 T17b TUMFGD2 TUMFGD2b TUMFGD3b TUMFGD4 TUMFGD4b TFFGD6 TMFGDb TMFGDc
Small town	M1, T12c T13b T13c E16 TUFFGDed	M5, M9, M11, M12b, M14b, M15, M18, M18b, M19, M19b, M20 T6b T8b T13 T18 K14 K15 K15b E11b E17 TUMFGD6	
Large town	M8 E11 E20b KFFGD8	M3, M4, M7, M14c T6	T7c T7d T14b TUMFGD3 TUMFGD5c TUMFGD7b TUMFGDc
Capital city	M18, T1c, T2b, T4, T5b T5c T8 T10d T10d T13d T13e T18b T19 T20 T20b TUMFGD1 TUMFGD1b K7 K7b K11 K11b KFFGD10 E12 EUFGD1 (8 people), EUFGD2 (6 people) TUFFGD1 TUFFGD1b TUFFGD2e TUFFGD3 TUFFGD3c TMFGD7c	M13, T2c, T2d T3 T3b T3c T4b T10 T10b T10c T11 T19b K1 E3 E7 E20 EFGD2b EFGD2d TFFGD4 TUFFGD2 TUFFGD2b TUFFGD3b TMFGD2 KFFGD4 KFFGD5	T7 T7b T11b T14c T16b T16c TUMFGD5 TUMFGD5b TUMFGD7 TFFGD3 TFFGD3b TFFGD4b TFFGD5 TFFGD5b TUFFGD6 TUFFGD6b TMFGD4 TMFGD5
International	M8b M10b M14 M16b	M16	
Unclear	EFGD2c TUFFG3d	T9 T12 T12b E1b E2 E6 TMFGD3 TMFGD3b TMFGD6	TFFGD1 TFFGD1b TMFGD1
Key motivations – Employment/business	M1, M8, M10b, M14, M18, T1c T4 T5b T5c T13b T13c T13d T13e T18b T19 T20 T20b K7 K7b K11 K11b E1 E11 E16 EUFGD1 EUFGD2 KFFGD8 KFFGD10	M14b T4b T13 K15 E1b E2 KFFGD5	T14 T14b T14c T15 T15b T15c T16 T16b T16c T17 T17b TUMFGD3 TUMFGD3b
Education	M1 E20b	M3, M4, M5, M6, M7, M13, M14c E3 E7	E6
Failure in farming	E1 EUFGD1e EUFGD1? EUFGD2?		
Land issues	M2, M17 E12 EUFGD1 EUFGD1d EUFGD1?		
Marriage		M3, M4, M9, M10, M11, M12, M12b, M14b, M15, M16, , M18b, M18c, M19, M19b, M20, T1a, T2c, T2d T3 T3b T3c T5 T6 T6b T6c	

		T9 T12 T12b T18 T19b T19c TFFGD2 TFFGD2b K14 K15b E2 E11b E20 EFGD2 TFFGD4 TMFGD6	
Influenced by others/Lifestyle	M1, M10b M14, T10d T10d T20 T20b E1 E11 E16 EFGD2c EUFGD2b	M10, M14b T10 T10b T10c E1b E6 E11b	
Trigger events Family death		M11 E11c EFGD2b KFFGD4	
Completion of stage of education	M1 T18 T20 T20b K11 K11b EUFGD1b EUFGD1f	M7 M16 T11 T18b E3 E20 EFGD2b EFGD2d	T11b
Climate shock			
Other shock	M8,	M9 M15 E2 E11c E17	
None	EUFGD2?		
Facilitating agents - Relatives	M1, M2, M8, M17 T5b T5c T10d T18 K7 K7b K11 K11b E11 EUFGD1? EUFGD1?KFFGD8 KFFGD10	M3, M4, M6, M7, M13, M14c T10 T10b T10c T11 E1b E2 E3 E6 E7 E11b E17 E18 E20 KFFGD4 KFFGD5	T7c T7d T11b
Friends	M8b, M16b K7 K7b K11 K11b E16 EUFGD1? EUFGD1? EUFGD2? KFFGD8 KFFGD10	K1 KFFGD4 KFFGD5	
Agents/Employers	M14,M18 T19		

More choice in types of migration for cash beneficiaries in Malawi

There is some evidence that cash transfers have provided beneficiaries with greater choices in the type of migration pursued. In Malawi, it appears that the availability of extra cash within the household has provided young migrants with greater choice in the type of migration that they can pursue. There was a higher number of migration for marriage among adolescent girls and migration for labouring work among adolescent boys in non-beneficiary households. By comparison, beneficiary households mentioned higher education as a reason for migration for both boys and girls.. Assuming that secondary education will improve the life-chances of these youth, this confirms the hypothesis that cash benefits can enable better choices leading to adaptive rather than maladaptive migration.

Staying Put – Maladaptation or Adaptation?

There were many reasons for people to not migrate. The key reasons the participants discussed related to their ability, obligations and income sources, including a) not being able to migrate on account of being too poor, old, ill or disabled b); having ties to the village through family obligations – for example, E15 migrated once due to poverty but came back

because there was nobody to look after his parents; c) emotional attachment to the village/land; or d) non-farm income/remittances that smoothed incomes during the lean season.

Migration costs too high

In Kenya it emerged that even when pastoralists wanted to migrate after their animals died because of the drought, they could not do so because they were too poor. In Malawi only those whose transport and accommodation costs were funded were able to migrate. Interviews with non-beneficiaries indicated that even migrating to Mchinji town would require around MWK 8,000 (\$29) for transport and temporary accommodation, which was well beyond the reach of most poor people. M7, M11 and M15 said that people want to migrate but cannot due to a lack of funds. These findings support the trapped population thesis of the Foresight report which is that those who lack the resources to migrate may be trapped in adverse situations.

The availability of the cash benefit has mitigated this predicament by providing those who want to stay back or those who cannot move, with more choices to diversify their income sources locally.

Cash enabling people to stay

In Ethiopia and Malawi cash payments offer the poor the option of staying instead of embarking on low-paid insecure and poor types of migration. In the case of Ethiopia there is evidence that the PSNP has provided the means for coping with the lean season which would previously have been achieved through migration and other casual work. Take the case of E1 (box 7) who has several younger migrants in the household but who is content to remain in the village with the support of the programme.

Box 6 Staying Put

E1 has a large family with five children living with him, as well as a son who migrates seasonally to Humara, and a daughter who has migrated to Wollega to live with her uncle. E1 has been a PSNP beneficiary since the programme began, and is clear that it has improved his living standards. He receives 280 birr every two months and uses the money to purchase food and fertilizer. He has one ox, which he attained with a loan, which he uses to till the land alone, because the children still living with him are too young to assist. He has lived most of his life in that area, saying that 'life is good in this Kebele except the problems that dramatic climate changes bring.' Whilst he did migrate away for three years when he was younger, like many people in the older generation, he believes this would not have been necessary if the PSNP had been in place at that time. Indeed, had it not been for the PSNP, E1 believes he would have been working 'as a guard at a relative's house' instead of working on the land. His other sources of livelihood have included indemnities from a Chinese company that used his land, and participation in agricultural conferences, which he hopes to use to gain additional loans.

He notes that he has family members who have migrated due to climate changes, although it is not clear that this was a key factor in the decisions of his own children, who 'were inspired by other youth who earned a better living' and could not obtain property at home. The son, having failed to make a living in farming, migrated without telling E1 to work as a labourer for a wealthier household in Humera. Meanwhile, his daughter left unannounced to live with her uncle, who paid for her travel costs which she would pay for by working as a house worker. E1 knows relatively little about the circumstances of his daughter, other than that she is staying with family. At this stage, neither of the children seems to have accumulated much in their destinations, and E1 says that only migrants who find government jobs make enough money to send back remittances. The PSNP has not obviously impacted on migration within E1's household. While it has clearly increased E1's living standards within the Kebele, it does not provide enough finance or other assets to provide a rural livelihood for E1's children. The level of disaffection between the older and younger generations is clear from E1's assertion that if his other children wanted to migrate, they would not tell him about it.

In Mchinji cash benefits appear to have enabled elderly beneficiaries to stop migrating in search of a livelihood (FGD with beneficiaries and interview with District Commissioner for Mchinji). This is a change that they welcomed at their age (beneficiaries were mostly above 50 and even those who were living with HIV had to do casual *ganyu* work to survive)

Diversification of income sources among beneficiary households

The situation of beneficiaries who did not migrate was arguably better than non-beneficiaries who did not migrate because the beneficiaries were able to use the cash to diversify income sources. This was observed in Ethiopia, Tanzania and Malawi. Any surplus after meeting basic needs is usually spent on farming e.g. seed and fertilizer (E1,E7) or livestock, chicken rearing and occasionally on health (E3 T17 and TFFGD1) or house improvements (T17). Very rarely were investments made to diversify completely out of agriculture, though.

In Ethiopia, where household size and the number of school going children had a bearing on the amount of cash received, larger households and especially households with more school going children, possibly benefited from economies of scale in being able to save and invest after essential expenditure. But how this surplus is invested depends on the labour availability/dependency ratio of the household. In one case (E7), a young male beneficiary with seven school going children, he had used the cash to buy fertilizer for his farm as well as goats, a cow and a donkey. He is now in the process of buying more land. He feels that he did well because he spent "the money judiciously whereas others spend it on alcohol". However his economic position at the time of joining the scheme; the availability of labour in the household and the total benefits received may have all played a role. In contrast is the situation of E8 (direct beneficiary) who is an old woman living with her husband who is too old to till their land. Both her sons are migrants but two of the grandchildren live with her. These however are not taken into account by the programme and she receives 140 birr per month, which she uses to pay for hired in labour. She says the money is not enough to invest in anything else. This is not surprising considering that beneficiaries who have to work for the cash benefit are these who have able-bodied people in the household, as in the case of E7, whereas direct beneficiaries are, by definition, labour-constrained.

In Tanzania it was mentioned during FGDs that cash had been used to open small shops and start chicken-rearing businesses (TFFGD1) or charcoal-making businesses (TFFGD2). In Malawi there was mention of people starting to sell vegetables (MKII1-5). For example M7 a widow in her 50s has been a recipient for three years, receiving MKw2800 per month until the recent interruption in payments. She has used the money to acquire livestock (4 goats), educate 3 children to secondary level, and raise the capital for a small business selling fresh vegetables. Chicken rearing was mentioned by a number of beneficiaries.

Diversification has been helped by social networks, experience and entrepreneurial skills as well as the existence of complementary interventions in some areas. Take the case of E10 who became a beneficiary after he returned from military service “I had nothing to work on here. I couldn’t farm because I didn’t have land, and I didn’t have any cattle to herd, breed or sell. Basically, I didn’t have anything to live with. Then I became a beneficiary of safety net since I was one of the poorest people in the area”. It appears that E10 was then able to use his experience and connections to progress rapidly. “From the money I got from safety net, I bought a sewing machine. I also raise goats, oxen, and cows. I’m the first to get a loan from the World Bank in this area. After I became a beneficiary, I got the opportunity to all the above and I am better now. Thanks to the government’s support.”

While livestock keeping, chicken rearing and selling vegetables all have strong backward linkages to agriculture they arguably provide more liquid assets that can be sold in the event that circumstances become even more adverse. The ability to adapt to deteriorating environmental conditions would also depend on the degree of collective action within the community and in this regard cash transfers may be helping people to become more included (Box 8). Similarly interviews with Kenyan beneficiaries suggest that the programme has improved their credit worthiness- for example K5, a 29-year old female beneficiary, says that she can now get goods on credit without any problem.

These findings suggest that cash benefits have resulted in adaptive responses amongst those who choose to stay. This proves our hypothesis related to the ability of cash to offer people more adaptive choices related to migration.

Box 7 Social Impacts

Even when the money is too little to lift households out of poverty, there are gradual changes that have nonetheless raised the social status of beneficiary households. Take the case of E9 a 74 year old indirect beneficiary working as a guard. He has three children, all living away; one left during the Derg regime and two are married. He himself used to migrate in the past to Jimma, Tolay and Arsi but does not migrate any more. “I strived a lot to raise my children. Now, I’m living my life because I am done with raising my children. They are all by themselves now and do not need my support.” He receives 140 birr every month for himself and his wife. “Previously, I used to borrow some money from the rich when food ran out. Now I don’t do that, I already have the money to be given to me from the government so until I get that money we eat what we have got from our farm, and then the money comes from the government so I stopped borrowing money from the wealthy as I used to.” He says his social standing in the community has also improved “I have a lot of participation in community

activities. For instance, I'm a mediator. I've also an administrative role in community meetings. If I haven't received the assistance from the government, one I wouldn't have time to engage in these because I would have gone elsewhere to bring money for my family and second nobody would have treated me as they are treating me now because I would have been extremely poor."

Conclusions: Social Protection Needed For Migrants

Based on the literature, two polarized hypotheses were proposed about the role of cash transfers in relation to migration. On one hand, it was hypothesised that the injection of cash could potentially facilitate the decision to migrate, for instance by allowing beneficiaries (or beneficiaries' relatives) to cover all or part of the costs associated with migration (transport, agent fees, settlement in a new place, etc.). On the other hand, it was hypothesized that households use the cash to overcome constraints in rural production, thereby reducing the need to migrate.

Empirical testing of these hypotheses indicates that neither is fully substantiated. Based on our results, cash transfers seem may stimulate migration by enabling education but are rarely used directly to bear the costs of migration.

The second hypothesis is partially borne out through the research in Ethiopia where some older beneficiaries were found to be staying put because they no longer have to (or want to) migrate to earn during the off season. This corroborates findings of a review of the PSNP (Personal Communication from DFID Advisers), which found that beneficiaries are not migrating. What does slightly mitigate their vulnerability is the fact that many are also investing in non-farm occupations which are not as vulnerable to climate change, and in livestock, which is arguably a more liquid asset than land and could, in theory, allow farmers to recover investments and move elsewhere in the future. In Tanzania also, cash benefits had been used to purchase livestock and start small businesses.

Adolescent boys and girls often migrate without the knowledge or permission of their parents and this emerged strongly in the Ethiopian cases as well as the Tanzanian FGDs. This may explain to some extent the weak link between cash transfers and migration as the potential migrant would have to disclose their plans to ask for money if their parents are the beneficiaries. There were gendered differences in the reasons for young people migrating. While young males (adolescent boys and young men roughly in the age group 14-25) were motivated by the search for business and employment opportunities as well as a search for a 'better life-style', young females migrate for marriage or higher education. The bulk of migration was to capital cities; there was hardly any international migration.

Further research would be required to establish whether these patterns observed in a small number of households hold good for other larger regions and rural areas. The findings should therefore be interpreted with caution.

In view of the vulnerabilities of rural-urban migrants mentioned during the interviews it is necessary that policy responses urgently address the issue of social protection for vulnerable rural-urban migrants. Existing debates on social protection for migrants either examine the role played by social protection in the migration decision (Zanker and Himmelstine 2012) or address the portability and access to rights for international movements between countries (e.g. Sabates-Wheeler and Feldman 2011). Complementary debates about internal (domestic) migrants are missing however. Urgent action is required a) to explicitly link analyses of social protection and migration policies, and b) to address the needs of internal migrants who are unable to access social protection programmes on account of not being officially recognised residents of their host city/town. Young migrants who migrate without the support of family are especially vulnerable and efforts need to be made to address the vulnerabilities derived from their status of migrant rather than attempting to reduce such migration. Where governments are slow to respond, there is a role for civil society in addressing protection gaps that may be faced by urban migrants and there are successful examples from other countries, which could offer useful lessons.

Next Steps

In order to answer the question of whether cash transfer projects reduce (or increase) migration for the purposes of *programming*, it is suggested that a wider review of the available evidence is undertaken, completed by targeted fieldwork to fill any remaining gaps. This new analysis should consider a larger number of cash transfer projects and countries/regions covering different types of cash transfer programmes, different sizes of transfers, and different designs (targeted, universal, conditional) in order to increase the wider applicability of the results.

For this, existing data could be productively utilised; for example the World Bank Living Standards Measurement Surveys have been conducted in a number of countries with questions on migration. It should therefore be possible to probe the connection between cash transfers and migration using these data. Another potential source of data could be the M&E data held by the cash programmes, which could be analysed for impacts on mobility. Given the variability of programme design and beneficiary group characteristics, it would be necessary to develop a typology of these and also introduce consideration of age and gender in order to probe deeper into these connections.

References

- Adebusoye, P.M. 2006. *Geographic Labour Mobility in Sub-Saharan Africa*, International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Working Paper No. 1 on Globalization, Growth and Poverty, March, Ottawa, <http://www.idrc.ca/uploads/user---S/11438237051GGPWP1---migration.pdf>.
- Andersson, Jens A. 2006. Informal moves, informal markets: International migrants and traders from Mzimba District, Malawi. *African Affairs* 420: 375-397.
- Asfaw, Woldie Degefa Tolossa & Gete Zeleke (2010): Causes and impacts of seasonal migration on rural livelihoods: Case studies from Amhara Region in Ethiopia. *Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift - Norwegian Journal of Geography*, 64:1, 58-70
- Azuara, O., (2009). Does Poverty Alleviation Increase Migration? Evidence from Mexico. MPRA Paper 17599.
- Baker, J., (2012) Migration and mobility in a rapidly changing small town in northeastern Ethiopia. *Environment and Urbanisation*, 24: 1,345-367
- Barrientos, A. (2006) Social Assistance and Integration with the Labour Market in ILO (2006) *Social Protection and Inclusion*. Geneva: International Labour Organization . Pp 165-182.
- Beegle, K. and Michelle Poulin (2012) Migration and the Transition to Adulthood in Contemporary Malawi. Policy Research Working Paper 6200 Washington D.C.: The World Bank
- Beegle, K., De Weerd, J. and Dercon S. (2011). Migration and economic mobility in Tanzania: evidence from a tracking survey. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 93(3): 1010–1033
- Beguy, D., Bocquier P. and E. Msiyaphazi Zulu (2010). Circular migration patterns and determinants in Nairobi slum settlements. *Demographic Research* VOLUME 23, ARTICLE 20, PAGES 549-586. <http://www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol23/20/>
- Bryceson, D.F. (1999) *Sub-Saharan Africa Betwixt and Between: Rural Livelihood Practices and Policies*, Leiden. Africa Studiecentrum, De-agrarianization and Rural Employment Programme [DARE] Working Paper vol. 43.
- Bryceson, D. F. (2002). The Scramble in Africa, *World Development* 30 (5): 725-39.
- Chinsinga, B. 2009 Political Economy of Cash Transfers In Malawi. A Report prepared for the Overseas Development Institute, University of Malawi. <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/5753.pdf>
- Christiansen R. (1984) The Pattern of Internal Migration in Response to Structural Change in the Economy of Malawi 1966-77. *Development and Change*. Volume 15, Issue 1

- de Haan, A. (1999). Livelihoods and poverty: the role of migration - a critical review of the migration literature. *Journal of Development Studies* 36(2), 1-47.
- DFID (2011) Cash Transfers Evidence Paper. Policy Division. London: Department for International Development. UK Government.
- Dungumaro, E.W., (2009) Consequences of female migration for families in areas of origin, the case of Tanzania, paper presented at the Sixth IUSSP International Conference on Population available at <http://iussp2009.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=91976>
- Ellis, F. 2003. A livelihoods approach to migration and poverty reduction London: Department for International Development.
- Englund, Harri. 2002. The Village in the city, the city in the village: Migrants in Lilongwe. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 28: 137-154.
- Erulkar, Annabel S. Tekle-Ab Mekbib, Negussie Simie & Tsehai Gulema (2007). Migration and Vulnerability among Adolescents in Slum Areas of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia *Journal of Youth Studies*. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13676260600805697>
- Ezra Markos (2001). Rural Out-migration in the Drought Prone Areas of Ethiopia: A Multilevel Analysis *International Migration Review* Volume 35, Issue 3, pages 749–771
- Foresight. 2011. *Migration and Global Environment Change*. London: Government Office for Science. London.
- Gray, C. and V. Mueller (2011) Drought and Population Mobility in Rural Ethiopia. *World Development* Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 134–145, 2012.
- Greiner, C. 2010. Patterns of Translocality: Migration, Livelihoods and Identities in Northwest Namibia. *Sociologist*, Vol.60, No.2, pp. 131-161.
- Haapanen, Toni (2011). Rural Food System Change in Tanzania during the Post-Ujamaa Era. A Case Study from Western Bagamoyo District. PhD Thesis, Turku University, Finland <http://www.doria.fi/handle/10024/72580>
- Hagen-Zanker, J. and C. Leon Himmelsteine (2012) How does access to social protection programmes affect the decision to migrate? ODI Background Note April 2012.
- Liviga, Athumani J. and Rugatiri D.K. Mekacha Youth Migration And Poverty Llevation: (Wamachinga) In Dar Es Salaam University of Dares Salaam Research Report No. 98.5
- Long, N. 2008. Translocal Livelihoods, Networks of Family and Community, and Remittances in Central Peru, in: J. DeWind and J. Holdaway (eds) *Migration and Development Within and Across Borders: Research and Policy Perspectives on Internal and International Migration*. (Geneva, New York: International Organization for Migration),

- Martin PL, Taylor JE. (1996). The anatomy of a migration hump. In Development strategy, employment, and migration: Insights from models, ed. JE Taylor, pp. 43-62. Paris: OECD, Development Centre
- Mbonile, M. and Simon, D. (1995) Structural adjustment and rural development in Tanzania: the case of Makete District. In Simon, D.;Spengen, W. van;Dixon, C.;Närman, A. (eds.) Structurally adjusted Africa: poverty, debt and basic needs. 1995 pp. 136-158
- Mbonile MJ (1993) Migration and Structural Change in Tanzania: The Case of Makete District University of Liverpool PhD Thesis.(Unpublished).
- McKenzie David J.(2007) A Profile of the World's Young Developing Country Migrants IZA DP No. 2948 Discussion Paper Series. Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit Institute for the Study of Labor
- Miller Candace, Maxton Tsoka and The Mchinji Evaluation Team (2007) Evaluation of the Mchinji Cash Transfer Baseline Report Preliminary Findings http://www.unicef.org/malawi/Baseline_Evaluation_of_the_Mchinji_Cash_Transfer.pdf
- Mtika, Mike Mathambo. 2007. Political economy, labor migration, and the AIDS epidemic in rural Malawi. Social Science and Medicine 64(12): 2454-2463.
- Pankhurst, A. 1992. *Resettlement and Famine in Ethiopia: The Villagers' Experience*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Rahmato, D. 1991. *Famine and Survival Strategies*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
- Rahmato, D. 2003. *Resettlements in Ethiopia: The Tragedy of Population Relocation in the 1980s*. Forum for Social Studies Discussion Paper 11. Addis Ababa: FFSS.
- Ruth M. C. Evans (2005). Social Networks, Migration, and Care in Tanzania, *Journal of Children and Poverty*, 11:2, 111-129
- Sabates-Wheeler, R. and Feldman, R. (eds.). 2011. Migration and Social Protection, Claiming Social Rights Beyond Borders. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Schillinga, Janpeter and Elise Remling (2011) Local Adaptation and National Climate Change Policy in Kenya: Discrepancies, Options, and the Way Forward. Research Group Climate Change and Security, Institute for Geography and KlimaCampus, Hamburg University, Grindelberg 7, 20144 Hamburg, Germany.
https://klimacampus.de/fileadmin/user_upload/klimacampus/1_Dokumente/4_Forschung/Schilling_Remling_2011_Adaptation_Kenya_UN_Summer_Academy.pdf
- Southern African Migration Project (2006) There is nothing we can do: HIV/AIDS Vulnerability and Migrant Commercial Farm Workers in Southern Africa

Stark, O., and Bloom, D. (1985). The new economics of labor migration. *American Economic Review*, 75(2), 173–178.

Stark, O. and Lucas, R.E.B. (1988) Migration, Remittances, and the Family. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 36(3), 465–481.

Stark, O. & Levhari, D. 1982. On Migration and Risk in LDCs. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 31(1), 191–196.

Tareke, G. 2009. *The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

United Nations. 2010. *World Population Policies 2009*. New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

Wakhungu, Judi W., Elvin Nyukuri, Dan Ongor, Charles Tonui (2010) Oyola And Wakesi In Kenya: Locals Adapting To Effects Of Climate Change, Report on Community Based Adaptation to Climate Change in Africa. African Centre for Technology Studies, Nairobi.

World Bank. (2005). Well-being and poverty in Ethiopia: The role of agriculture and agency. Report No. 29468-ET.

Appendix 1

Adaptive Social Protection: migration as an adaptive response, and the role of cash transfers.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

BACKGROUND

DFID's approach paper on adaptation, prepared for the International Climate Fund, describes social protection as one of its six priority sectors for intervention. The accompanying sector strategy paper, specifically on social protection, highlights the vital role cash transfers can play in strengthening the resilience of people and communities in increasingly marginal environments.

This strategy paper draws on recent work defining the need for closer alignment and programming across three different work streams: adaptation, social protection and disaster risk reduction. The model of 'adaptive social protection' was the subject of a conference led by the World Bank and the Institute for Development Studies last year. Social protection systems have been the subject of extensive review, including that conducted by the National Audit Office earlier this year. However, neither study evaluates the extent to which existing social protection systems engage with climate change; though a few comparative studies exist to help determine best practice in this area.

The social protection sector strategy paper specifically highlights the risk that adaptation programmes focused only on making agricultural systems more resilient, can trap families into increasingly unsustainable and ever more marginal livelihoods. This was the finding of a recent review of Ethiopia's large and extensive PSNP programme⁴. The recently released Foresight report on migration identifies migration as a rational and adaptive strategy to marginal environments and increasingly uncertain livelihoods. It also found that though 75% of current migration takes place within a country rather than across borders it is not the poor that migrate - resulting in 'trapped populations' which cannot afford to move away from vulnerable environments and ever decreasing yields.

However, there is also anecdotal evidence that social protection systems that take the form of cash transfers are being used by whole households to finance migration and a move to a different life, often in urban or peri-urban areas. This study will look at four large and well established social protection programmes in East Africa, and evaluate the extent to which cash transfers are enabling migration, where people migrate to, and whether the cash is sufficient to enable them to invest effectively in establishing new livelihoods.

Objectives

To undertake a study which will evaluate how, and under what conditions cash transfers are effective in enabling households and communities to choose migration as an effective adaptation strategy, and what systems, mechanisms and policies could be put in place to

⁴ IDS – adaptive social protection

improve this choice, as well as to increase the likelihood of successfully establishing new livelihood strategies on arrival in the new location.

Recipient

Climate change communities, donor partners and country offices who are designing social protection programmes and to provide a broader range of options for designing adaptation programmes and programmes supporting urbanisation.

Methodology/Scope

Methodology should involve but is not limited to the following:

A desk based analysis of programme evaluations in Kenya, Ethiopia, Malawi and Tanzania, as well as field work. The latter will involve investigation with vulnerable communities and recipients of cash transfers to determine attitudes to migration, and collect evidence of where and how people have migrated, and whether this strategy has been perceived as successful. It will also consider the urban areas favoured by these migrants to assess whether livelihoods have become more resilient as a result of the move.

It will also:

- investigate the extent to which the design and eligibility criteria associated with cash transfers are cited as a reason not to migrate, and whether this is influenced by, for example, the ability of such systems to adapt to new and existing patterns of seasonal migration strategies, as well as the size of the transfer.
- provide a contextual analysis of attitudes to migration and migrants, and the extent to which 'pull' factors, particularly a history of prior migration out of the area influences the decision to migrate, and the ability to establish alternative livelihoods on arrival.
- assess the extent to which migration is seasonal or permanent, whether to rural or urban areas, and whether the locations are part of a traditional pattern of movement, or to new locations.
- specific vulnerabilities faced by migrants in urban areas, and urban policies which facilitate, or not, the integration of such migrants, and their access to resources. The Foresight report finds evidence that in a significant amount of migration, people are moving into areas which are even more vulnerable than the ones they have left. Vulnerability in this sense largely relates to migration from rural areas into coastal cities vulnerable to sea level rises and tidal surges. However, vulnerability is also defined by access to resources, as migrants tend to move into areas of cities which are least served by utilities, health and education, and security services.

Reporting

The final written report will be in the region of twenty pages, and include policy recommendations for improving the ability of social protection and cash transfer programmes to factor in responses to climate change. This will focus on strategies which

empower vulnerable populations to make a greater range of choices, include the decision to move away from marginal areas, and establish new livelihoods.

An executive summary shall not exceed 2-3 pages.

The final report and summary should be submitted to Kirsty Mason, Social Development Adviser in DFID's Adaptation Team, Climate and Environment Department, (01355 843586) who will be the lead contact, by 10 weeks from the start date.

DFID Coordination

Any enquiries of a technical nature should be forwarded to Kirsty Mason. Enquiries of a contractual nature should be directed to Nicola Cairns, Programme Manager, DFID's Adaptation Team, Climate and Environment Department (01355 843674).

Timing and expertise

In addition to desk based analysis of programme documents, the project will involve at least one week in each location, with experts in social and political analysis, migration, social protection systems and rural livelihoods. The teams will visit both a sample of rural locations, as likely departure points, as well as locations which have been targeted as urban destinations.

Unless otherwise agreed with DFID the fieldwork should take place in the four field sites concurrently, which will require good coordination, and a clear analytical framework to be agreed before hand.

Start date: As soon as possible.

Outputs delivered: Interim Report by 6 weeks from start date.
Final Report by 10 weeks from start date.

Appendix 2

PSNP

The Productive Safety Net Programme has been in place in Ethiopia since 2004, offering a combination of food and cash payments for participation in public works schemes and direct transfers to households with a labour supply. Targeting is achieved through community organisations, with key decisions being taken at the Kebele level. In order to ensure that beneficiaries are in the programme for long enough to ensure 'graduation', the Government has encouraged kebele's to ensure that families are involved for a minimum of three years. It is aimed at food insecure woredas, and currently reaches 8.2 million people (11% of the population).

TASAF-II

The Community-Based Conditional Cash Transfer (CB-CCT) Programme of TASAF-II was launched in 2009 and operates in three districts councils namely Bagamoyo, Chamwino and Kibaha. Households must satisfy the characteristics of being very poor to be eligible and this is determined by the Village Assembly and verified through Proxy Means Testing. Only those households which are very poor, not receiving similar benefits in kind or cash from another programme and those which are homes to older people (60 +) or an orphan or vulnerable children (OVC) qualify. Very Poor is defined as meeting at least three of the following characteristics:

- Lack of a basic dwelling/shamba
- Difficulty having at least two meals per day
- No adult member has worked in the last month
- Children with clothes, shoes in poor condition
- Does not own livestock
- Does not own land

According to TASAF staff, children become beneficiaries based on the status of their households. If a household is identified as very poor, then the three categories (the older persons, under five and school going children) in these households become beneficiaries.

This scheme does not preclude migration because in theory, a household with a head of working age could receive the benefit if there is an old person or an eligible child. Benefits for children are health checks for 0-5 and schooling for 5-18. The design is five dollars basic transfer and five dollars additional transfer per school-going child.

HSNP

The Hunger and Safety Net Programme has been in place since 2008, and makes unconditional cash transfers to poor families in Kenya's four northern districts: Turkana, Marsabit, Mandera and Wajir, aiming to reach 300,000 people during its first phase (2008-2012). It uses a combination of community targeting (participating communities are invited to decide which are the most vulnerable households), categorical (all people over the age of

55, and dependency ratios to target the payments. The scheme also stands out for the innovative use of smartcards to ensure timely payments.

Mchinji Project

The Mchinji Social Cash Transfer programme has been in place since 2006, run by a combination of donors, including UNICEF, and the Malawian Government. It was covering 23,615 households in 2009 and reaches seven of Malawi's 27 districts. Unconditional cash payments are made to households which are deemed to be 'ultra-poor' (the poorest 10%) and which are also labour-constrained. The programme has suffered from administrative payments, leading people to go unpaid for several months.

Payments are made monthly but inconsistent (there are gaps in payments and no arrears are paid when such gaps occur). Payments range from MWK600 to MWK2800 per household thus a 1 person household would receive MK 600 (roughly US\$4), 2 person HH MK 1,000 (US\$7), 3 person HH MK 1,400 (US\$10) and so on. A bonus of MK 200 is given per primary school going child and MK 400 per secondary school going child.

Households that qualify for assistance should be classified as Ultra poor and Labour constrained. Ultra poor includes households of the lowest expenditure quintile and below the national ultra poverty line (only one meal per day, no valuable assets). Labour constrained means a household that has no able bodied member in the age group 18-64 who is fit for work (all are chronically sick or disabled or elderly or children) or when one member who is fit for work has to care for more than 3 dependents. Those in between 18 and 65 are eligible if they are disabled, living with HIV/AIDS, households with more than four dependants and households without assets (assets include livestock, oxcarts and bicycles). Despite the criterion of labour constrained, the programme does not preclude migration because under 18s can and do migrate. Also individuals living with HIV can work before chronic illness sets in.